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THE  DECLINE of 2.1 percent  in real gross national  product  from 1973  to 
1974  was  the  fourth  annual  dip  since  the mid-forties  (the others  occurred  in 
1954,  1958,  and 1970)  and  by far  the  largest.  With  the  benefit  of hindsight,  I 
shall,  in this  brief  paper,  discuss  what  happened  to the economy  and  to the 
economic  forecasters  in that  bleak  year.  In the  comments  addressed  to fore- 
casting,  I shall  not allocate  blame  or praise;  my purpose  rather  is to raise 
some questions  and infer some lessons that may be relevant  for future 
research  and application. 
What  Happened 
In combination,  the decline  in real  consumption  and in residential  con- 
struction  activity  from 1973 to 1974 accounted  for more than the total 
decline  in real  GNP (table  1).  These  were  also the  main  areas  of disappoint- 
ment  relative  to the expectations  of forecasters. 
CONSUMPTION 
The  2.3  percent  decline  in real  consumption  in 1974  is attributable  mainly 
to the  2.7 percent  decline  in real  disposable  income,  although,  by historical 
standards,  aggregate  consumption  was weak relative  to income.  The per- 
sonal  saving  rate  of 1974  was  7.9 percent,  virtually  unchanged  from  the 7.8 
Note: I want to thank  Nancy Delaney for her assistance  in the research. 
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percent  average  of the first  three  quarters  of 1973,  before  automobile  de- 
mand  plummeted.  Moreover,  the saving  rate of 1974  essentially  matched 
the  7.8 percent  average  of 1970-73;  in all years  of the 1970s  thus  far,  except 
1972,  the  personal  saving  rate  has  been  higher  than  in any  year  of the 1950s 
or 1960s. 
The share  of disposable  income  devoted  to nondurable  goods and ser- 
vices  (in current  dollars)  rose  from  74.7 percent  in 1973  to 76.5 percent  in 
1974,  the  biggest  one-year  jump  in the past  generation.  But  the share  spent 
on durables  fell from 14.4 percent  in 1973 to 13.0 percent  in 1974,  the 
biggest  one-year  drop in the past generation.  Autos, of course,  led the 
plunge:  the share  of disposable  income  spent on new cars fell to a post- 
Korean  annual  low of 3.8 percent  from  4.8 percent  in 1973  (5.1 percent  in 
the first  three  quarters).  But the decline  in new cars  generally  eclipses  that 
of all other consumer  goods in recessions,  quite apart from an energy 
crisis:  their  share  dropped  between  0.7 point and 1.1 points in the three 
previous  recession  years  (table  2).1  In short,  the  auto  collapse  in 1974  should 
be attributed  more  to a shortage  of real  income  than  to a shortage  of gaso- 
line, given income. 
Of course,  in line with standard  theoretical  reasoning  and empirical 
evidence,  a dip  (or even  slowdown)  of real  income  does not normally  have 
an  immediate  proportionate  effect  on consumer  expenditure.  Hence,  a drop 
in the saving  rate  is to be expected  when  income  sags. In that sense,  the 
unchanged  (as well as historically  high) saving  rate of 1974  is a mark of 
unusual  weakness  in consumer  demand.  But,  in fact,  the saving  rate  has  not 
displayed  any  distinct  countercyclical  pattern  during  recessions  in the post- 
war  era.  The  share  of disposable  income  spent  on nondurables  and  services 
has typically  risen  (as it did in 1974);  but the share  spent  on durables  has 
invariably  declined,  sometimes  dominating  the aggregate  consumption- 
income  ratio. 
In retrospect,  it is not at all difficult  to account  for historically  low con- 
sumption  in relation  to disposable  income  during  1974.  In line with past 
experience,  accelerating  (unanticipated)  inflation  may have  depressed  con- 
sumer  demand.2  Another  contributor  may have been the sharp  decline  in 
1. The auto share  held up rather  well in the early stages of the 1957-58 and 1960-61 
recessions,  unlike 1974. It then recovered  very slowly later in 1958 and 1961, after the 
economy  turned  up. 
2. F. Thomas Juster and Paul Wachtel, "Inflation and the Consumer," BPEA 
(1:1972), pp. 71-72. 210  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Table 2.  Shares of Selected Components  of Disposable Personal Income 
during  Peak and Recession Years, and Change, Selected Years, 1957-74 
Nondurable  Total  Personial 
goods and  durable  New  consumption 
Period  services  goods  automobilesa expenditures  Saving 
Level  (percent) 
1957  78.0  13.2  5.1  91.2  6.7 
1958  79.1  11.9  4.0  91.0  7.0 
1960  80.0  12.9  4.9  92.9  4.9 
1961  79.9  12.1  4.2  92.0  5.8 
1969  77.0  14.3  5.0  91.3  6.0 
1970b  76.0  13.5  4.3  89.5  8.0 
1973  74.7  14.4  4.8  89.1  8.2 
1974  76.5  13.0  3.8  89.5  7.9 
1973,  first  three 
quarters  74.8  14.8  5.1  89.6  7.8 
Change  (percentage  points) 
1957-58  1.1  -1.3  -1.1  -0.2  0.3 
1960-61  -0.1  -0.8  -0.7  -0.9  0.9 
1969-70  -1.0  -0.8  -0.7  -1.8  2.0 
1973-74  1.8  -1.4  -1.0  0.4  -0.3 
1973,  first  three 
quarters-1974  1.7  -1.8  -1.3  -0.1  0.1 
Sources: U.S.  Department of  Commerce, The National Income and Product Accounts of  the United 
States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables (1966), pp. 26, 33, 41, and Department of Commerce, U.S. National 
Income  and  Product  Accounts,  1964-69 (1973), pp. 48, 51, 52; Survey  of Current  Business,  vol. 54 (July 1974), 
pp. 19, 22, 23, and vol. 55 (March 1975), pp. 8, 9. 
a. The personal consumption expenditures component of gross auto product. 
b. Fourth quarter  excluded because of auto strike. 
real  household  financial  wealth  (33 percent  during  1973-74),  reflecting  in- 
flation  and falling  stock and bond prices.  Indeed,  consumer  expenditures 
held  up far  better  in 1974  than  would  have  been  implied  by some  estimates 
of the size and speed of the impact  of changes  in wealth  (or in real cash 
balances). 
To be sure,  the bumpy  quarterly  pattern  of consumer  demand  during 
1974  can  be explained  only  in terms  of special  and  transitory  influences  like 
the  unavailability  of gasoline  in the first  quarter,  the  way  the  announcement 
of major  price  increases  slated  for the 1975  automobile  models  helped  to 
sell 1974  cars  during  the  third  quarter,  and  the  way  that  temporary  rebound 
in automobile  demand  itself weakened  the fourth-quarter  performance. 
Nonetheless,  for the year  as a whole,  the behavior  of consumption  was  not 
much  of a mystery,  given  the decline  in real disposable  income. Arthur  M. Okun  211 
DISPOSABLE  INCOME 
Thus,  the basic  question  about  consumption  in 1974  is, what  made  real 
disposable  income  so weak?  And weak  it was! It registered  its first  annual 
decline  of the postwar  era,  and  its drop  (2.7 percent)  even  exceeded  that  of 
real  GNP.  The  average  of past  postwar  performances  would  have  suggested 
that a 2.1 percent  drop in real GNP would be associated  with approxi- 
mately  zero change  in real disposable  personal  income. 
By that  standard,  1974  produced  an unusual  income  squeeze,  exceeding 
21/2  percent.  Relative  price movements  account for about half of that 
squeeze.  The  implicit  deflator  for personal  consumption  expenditures  rose 
11.4  percent  from  1973  to 1974;  whereas  it typically  increases  a bit less  than 
the GNP deflator,  it advanced  by 1.1 percentage  points  more  in 1974.  Im- 
ported  oil was  the key item  that pushed  up consumer  prices  relative  to the 
GNP deflator. 
The  other  half  of the unusual  dent  in disposable  income  stemmed  mainly 
from fiscal  impacts.  Most significantly,  the built-in  flexibility  of the per- 
sonal  income  tax did not play its usual  role of cushioning  a recession.  Be- 
cause  the value  of personal  exemptions  and the width  of tax brackets  are 
set in nominal  rather  than real terms,  the progressivity  of the tax system 
operated  with  respect  to gains  in nominal  income  even  though  real  income 
was falling.  As a share of "earned  personal  income" (personal  income 
minus  transfer  payments),  federal  personal  taxes  rose  from 12.2  percent  in 
1973  to 13.0  percent  in 1974.  That  rise  squeezed  disposable  personal  income 
by 0.8 percent  ($8 billion).  In fact, with  no change  in income  tax laws,  the 
federal  tax share  of earned  income  would normally  be expected  to fall in 
recession.3  For example,  from 1957 to  1958, it declined  0.4 percentage 
point.  A second  and smaller  fiscal  squeeze,  exceeding  $2 billion,  stemmed 
from the increase  in personal  contributions  for social insurance  resulting 
from  a rise  in the maximum  earnings  base.  Transfer  payments  did provide 
some  cushion,  rising  about 19  percent  in nominal  terms,  but the additional 
buying  power  provided  by incremental  transfers  was eroded  by inflation. 
The real increase  amounted  to 61/2  percent,  far smaller  than in previous 
recession  years. 
In nominal  terms,  earned  personal  income  rose  at the same  rate  as GNP. 
But that reflected  the net effect of many contrary  forces: a drop in farm 
3. Joseph A. Pechman,  "Responsiveness  of the Federal Individual  Income Tax to 
Changes  in Income,"  BPEA (2:1973), pp. 403-05. 212  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
income,  a sharp  rise in personal  interest  income,  remarkable  strength  of 
employment  in the face of declining  output,  and a weak gain in hourly 
compensation  relative  to prices  of private  nonfarm  output.4 
RESIDENTIAL  CONSTRUCTION 
While  many  forces  influenced  the level of homebuilding,  its decline  dur- 
ing 1973-74  can be linked  closely  to the movement  of short-term  interest 
rates.  With  a remarkably  brief  lag, these seemed  to affect  deposit  inflows 
into thrift  institutions,  which  in turn  altered  the supply  of mortgages  and 
then homebuilding  in a prompt  chain reaction.  Short-term  interest  rates 
soared  in the spring  and summer  of 1973,  reaching  levels  far above  yields 
on thrift  deposits.  Monthly  deposit  inflows  into thrift  institutions,  which 
had  averaged  $3.6  billion  throughout  1972  and $2.6  billion  in the first  half 
of 1973,  shrank  to $1.3 billion  for the period  June-October  1973;  housing 
starts  fell sharply  in the second  half of 1973. 
Late  in that  year  and  early  in the next,  short-term  rates  eased  off and  net 
thrift  inflows  rebounded,  averaging  $2.1  billion  a month  from  October  1973 
to April 1974.  But, as interest  rates  turned  up sharply,  monthly  thrift  in- 
flows  averaged  less  than  $1  billion  in the  period  from  April  through  October 
1974.  Housing  starts,  which  had averaged  about 1.6 million  units  (annual 
rate)  from  December  1973  to June  1974,  plunged  to less than  a million  by 
the end of 1974.  In this period  of tight  money,  unlike  others,  expenditures 
on mobile  homes  were  hit hard  too; they  fell from  $4.1  billion  (annual  rate) 
in 1974:2  to $2.3 billion  in 1974:4. 
The  high  and  rising  pattern  of interest  rates  during  most  of 1973  is readily 
understandable:  nominal  GNP was growing  at a rate of 12 percent  while 
the  money  stock  was  kept  close  to the  61/2  percent  growth  track  that  charac- 
terized  the entire  period  from  the end of 1969  to the middle  of 1974.5  Why 
the  emerging  slowdown  of late 1973  was  enough  to turn  interest  rates  down 
for a while,  and  why  they  then soared  in the spring  and summer  (when  the 
growth  rate of nominal  GNP averaged  9 percent),  is not clear.  The turn- 
around  was associated  with a surge of business  loan demand  that the 
4. The movement of the "statistical discrepancy"  in the national accounts from 
-$5.0  billion in 1973  to -$0.1  billion in 1974 also "cost" $5 billion of income. 
5. From 1969:4 to 1974:2, the growth of M1 averaged  6.58 percent,  and the maxi- 
mum  deviation  of M1  from a smooth  trend  line connecting  those points was $3.0 billion 
in 1973:2. Arthur  M. Okun  213 
Federal  Reserve,  holding  M1  right  on track  during  the spring  quarter,  did 
not accommodate. 
The  spurt  in short-term  interest  rates  from March  to July  made  inevitable 
the second-half  plunge  in homebuilding  and  mobile  homes.  After  midyear, 
the Federal  Reserve  shifted  from  a quantity-oriented  monetary  policy  to a 
rate-oriented  strategy,  and allowed  the money  stock to sag below the pre- 
vious  track,  as credit  demands  waned.  While  it had  tolerated  an abrupt  rise 
in interest  rates  during  the spring,  it cushioned  the decline  in rates  during 
the fall and winter.  If the Federal  Reserve  had maintained  its quantity- 
oriented  policy after  midyear,  it might have sped the turnaround  in the 
credit-sensitive  areas  by several  months,  but it could no longer  have pre- 
vented  the housing  collapse  of the second  half. 
While  the impact  of high interest  rates on residential  construction  and 
mobile homes  is obvious,  any major  prompt  influence  of those rates on 
other  components  of expenditure  (consumer  durables  other than mobile 
homes,  inventory  investment,  and  plant  and  equipment)  is not visible  to the 
naked  eye-at  least not to mine. 
BUSINESS  INVESTMENT 
As currently  estimated  by the Department  of Commerce,  inventory  in- 
vestment  held up unusually  well during 1974 in relation  to final sales. 
During  the first  three  quarters  of 1974,  real  final  sales  ran  nearly  2 percent 
below  their  peak rate of 1973:3,  almost  matching  in that early  stage the 
maximum  peak-to-trough  decline  of any previous  postwar  recession.  Yet 
accumulation  of inventories  continued  at a rapid  rate  all year  long. Never 
before  in the postwar  period  had inventory  investment  remained  positive 
when  real  final  sales stayed  below their  peak for more  than two quarters. 
Clearly,  most of the accumulation  over that prolonged  period of five 
quarters  of submerged  real  final  sales  must  have  been  voluntary;  otherwise, 
production  would  have  been slashed  sooner.  And it is understandable  that 
business  wanted  additional  stocks.  First,  the rapid  advance  of final  sales  in 
1972  and  early  1973  must  have  left many  firms  with  inventories  below de- 
sired  levels  late in 1973.  Second,  the shortages,  delivery  delays,  and rising 
prices  that  marked  1973  and much of 1974  must  have led many  business- 
men to raise  their  targets  on desired  inventories  in relation  to sales. 
Business  fixed  investment  also remained  strong  during  much of 1974, 
barely  dropping  in real  terms  until  the  fourth  quarter.  Plant  and  equipment 214  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
outlays  anticipated  by businessmen  early  in 1974,  unlike  those  in previous 
recession  years,  were  not scaled  down  sharply  during  the  course  of the  year. 
Actual  outlays  for the year corresponded  closely to the anticipations  re- 
ported  in February  1974  ($112.4  billion  actual  vs. $112.7  billion  projected). 
Of  course,  since  prices  of capital  goods  rose  more  sharply  than  businessmen 
had  anticipated,  fulfilling  their  dollar  capital  budgets  meant  acquiring  less 
physical  capital  than  had been expected. 
The  same  pattern  of business  resistance  to declining  final  sales  evident  in 
inventory  and  fixed  investment  also was  displayed  in the demand  for labor. 
As I have  argued  previously,6  the expansive  personnel  policies  seem  attrib- 
utable  to (1) the momentum  of forces  and attitudes  that developed  during 
the 1973  boom; (2) an overly  optimistic  interpretation  of weak  final  sales 
early in 1974 as merely an embargo-induced  "energy  spasm";  and (3) 
"FIFO  illusion,"  a tendency  to take  seriously  the favorable  profits  bloated 
by inflationary  inventory  gains.  For those reasons,  firms  felt no strong  in- 
centive  to retrench  on employment,  or inventories,  or fixed  capital. 
In summary,  the consumer  was clobbered  by U.S. fiscal  policy and the 
"oil  tax"  during  1974;  and  homebuilding  was  battered  by monetary  policy. 
For  much  of the  year,  business  spending  and  hiring  supported  the  economy 
and  resisted  the downward  pull of the declining  sectors.  It is not clear  why 
so many  businessmen  seemed  to realize  so suddenly  around  August  that 
they  were  holding  up the economy  merely  by selling  goods to one another 
and  retaining  workers  they did not need. In any case, business  finally  lost 
the  tug-of-war,  and  then  the whole  economy  plunged  in the closing  months 
of 1974.  The trimming  of personnel  and production  that might  have been 
accomplished  gradually  earlier  in the year then took place abruptly  and 
frenetically  in 1974:4  and 1975:  1. 
What  Was  Expected 
While  the typical  forecast  of real  economic  activity  for 1974  was revised 
downward  periodically,  it remained  overly  optimistic  throughout. 
6. Arthur M. Okun, "Unemployment  and Output in 1974," BPEA (2:1974), pp. 
502-03. Arthur  M. Okun  215 
Table 3.  Median Predictions  of Changes in Real Gross National Product 
and in the GNP Deflator, 1974 over 1973, and Actual Changes 
Percent 
Date of prediction 
August December  February  May  August 
Prediction  period  1973  1973  1974  1974  1974  Actual 
Real GNP 
1974over 1973  2.6  1.1  0.6  -0.3  -1.2  -2.1 
1974:1 over 1973:4  0.6  -0.1  -0.6  -1.5a  -1.8a  -1.8 
1974:2 over 1973:4  1.2  0.1  -0.7  -1.6  -2.1l  -2.2 
1974:3 over 1973:4  1.7  0.4  -0.1  -1.1  -2.1  -2.7 
1974:4  over 1973:4  2.8  1.0  0.8  -0.2  -1.7  -4.9 
GNP  deflator 
1974  over 1973  4.6  5.9  7.0  8.4  9.4  10.3 
1974:1 over 1973:4  1.0  1.5  1.8  2.6a  2.9a  2.9 
1974:2 over 1973:4  2.0  2.7  3.5  4.7  5.2a  5.3 
1974:3 over 1973:4  3.1  4.1  5.0  6.4  7.4  8.3 
1974:4 over 1973:4  4.0  5.2  6.5  7.9  9.4  12.0 
Sources: American Statistical Association and National Bureau of Economic Research, "Third Quarter 
1974  Survey of the Economic Outlook" (September 1974; processed), and preceding relevant issues, table 1; 
Survey  of Current  Buisiness,  vol. 54 (May 1974) and vol. 55 (March 1975), tables 1, 17. 
a. Actual value based on Commerce Department estimate at that date. 
PRE-EMBARGO 
The first  round  of forecasts  for 1974,  prior  to the imposition  of the oil 
embargo  in October,  revealed  a broad  consensus  that the year would ex- 
perience  moderate  increases  in real output  (2 to 3 percent),  some modest 
uptrend  in unemployment,  and  a distinct  slowing  of inflation  (to roughly  5 
percent).  (The  median  forecast  of a sizable  sample  that  reports  quarterly  is 
shown  in table  3.) As James  Duesenberry  characterized  this consensus  in 
September 1973: "Most forecasters see a 'welcome slowdown' ....  pro- 
jecting  growth  rates  below the rate of expansion  of potential  output,  but 
still positive....  The strength  comes from plant and equipment  and in- 
ventory  investment,  while the weakness  lies in homebuilding  and a pro- 
jected  rise  in personal  saving  rates."7  The predicted  slowdown  in inflation 
stemmed  from  an expected  leveling-off  of the prices  of farm  products  and 
other  raw  materials. 
7. James  S. Duesenberry,  "Some  Observations  on Monetary  Policy,"  BPEA  (2:1973), 
p. 512. 216  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1975 
With  the embargo  and  explosion  in oil prices,  the basic  premises  of that 
initial  forecast  suddenly  became obsolete. From the point of view of a 
macroeconomist,  an event  like  the quadrupling  of oil prices  by the cartel  is 
fundamentally  exogenous.  If improvements  are to be made in appraising 
the likelihood  of such  major  disturbances,  the assignment  will have to be 
undertaken  by foreign  policy and commodity  experts,  rather  than mere 
GNP-men.  Even  in the  absence  of the oil crisis,  overall  prices  in 1974  would 
probably  have  risen  distinctly  more  and output  somewhat  less than in the 
pattern  envisioned  by the forecasters.  Nonetheless,  their  basic  scenario  of a 
nonrecessionary  slowdown  might well have been realized  had it not been 
for the oil shock. 
TURN  OF  THE  YEAR 
The  forecasts  made  at the turn  of the year  cranked  in some  impact  from 
the  petroleum  developments  and  some  lessons  from  continued  bad news  on 
inflation.  The  consensus  remained  fairly  broad  as it shifted  toward  more  in- 
flation  and less real growth.  The typical January-February  forecast  for 
1974  had the following  characteristics: 
1. Nominal  GNP was  expected  to grow  by about $100  billion,  or nearly 
8 percent. 
2. Real  GNP was  expected  to rise  only  a fraction  of 1 percent,  and  prices 
were  marked  up some 7 percent. 
3. The expected  quarterly  pattern  of real GNP was in the shape of a 
saucer,  with  the first  quarter  generally  pegged  down,  and the final  quarter 
up; disagreements  on the sign of movements  focused on the two middle 
quarters,  but they were expected  to register  only small changes,  whether 
plus  or minus. 
The true  magnitude  and significance  of the increases  in oil prices  were 
still  not apparent.  In January,  the price  of imported  oil was  not expected  to 
exceed  $8 a barrel;  it ultimately  rose  above  $12.  The Council  of Economic 
Advisers  noted  that  the price  rise  through  December  1973,  when  applied  to 
the volume  of imports  of 1973,  would  amount  to "less  than 1 percent"  of 
GNP, and  labeled  this calculation  as "probably  an outside  estimate  of the 
costs in 1974."8 
8. Economic  Report  of the  President  together  with  the Annual  Report  of the Council  of 
Econiomic  Advisers,  February  1974, p. 26. Arthur  M. Okun  217 
The weakened  demand  for automobiles  had become  apparent,  and was 
the key element  in the accurate  forecast  of a decline  in real output for 
1974:1.  A few forecasters  expected  major  losses  in the nation's  productive 
capability  as a result  of the scarcity  of oil, but  the majority  correctly  antici- 
pated  no serious  supply  impact  from  the embargo.  Generally,  some  explicit 
assumption-most  often, "near  midyear"-was made about the termina- 
tion of the embargo.  That event was expected  to aid the rebound  in the 
second  half,  particularly  by promoting  recovery  of automobile  demand.  A 
few economists  called  attention  to the drain  that the "oil tax" inflicted  on 
real  consumer  income,  quite  apart  from  the embargo,  but many  ignored  it. 
Continuing  strength  in plant and equipment  spending  and a rebound  in 
housing  were  expected  regardless  of the oil situation. 
The  expected  rebound  in housing  was  linked  to a dip of interest  rates  to 
levels  that  would  restore  thrift  inflows.  Interest  rates  were,  in fact,  falling  at 
the  turn  of the  year;  but, as Tobin  pointed  out,9  it was  hard  to reconcile  the 
prediction  of continued  declines  with  the prevailing  expectations  of 8 per- 
cent  growth  of nominal  GNP, on the one  hand,  and  51/2  or  6 percent  growth 
of the money  stock, on the other. 
Another  bullish  element  was the expected  strength  of inventory  invest- 
ment.  That  prediction  was seriously  biased  upward  by the original  Com- 
merce  Department  underestimate  of inventory  investment  in 1973.  Initially, 
inventory  investment  for 1973:4  was  pegged  at $15.9  billion  (annual  rate), 
in contrast  to the current  estimate  of $28.9  billion  for the period;  that for 
the  entire  year 1973  was  initially  put at $7.4  billion,  in contrast  to the pres- 
ent $15.4  billion.  The  forecasters  were  told that the shelves  were  bare,  and 
expected  them  to be restocked. 
The  forecasters  were  also  misled  about  the prospects  for federal  expendi- 
tures  in the first  half of 1974.  Actual  expenditures  on the national  income 
and  product  basis  during  fiscal  1974  ran $7 billion  below  the projection  in 
the budget  document  of February  1974.  While $2 billion  of that total re- 
flected  an accounting  change  (involving  a complex  transaction  with  India), 
the remaining  $5 billion-$10  billion at annual  rates  during  the first  half 
of 1974-did make  a substantial  difference. 
Because  the large  errors  on the price  level and output  were offsetting, 
the  prediction  of nominal  GNP turned  out to be accurate.  In fact,  the GNP 
deflator  rose 10.3  percent  while  output  fell 2.1 percent,  yielding  the same  8 
9. James  Tobin,  "Monetary  Policy  in 1974  and Beyond,"  BPEA  (1:1974), pp. 221-22. 218  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
percent  gain  in nominal  GNP implied  by the projected  7 +  1 pattern.  In- 
deed, CEA  predicted  a rise  in nominal  GNP of $102 billion,  the increase 
now shown  by the Commerce  estimates.  But the significance  of the actual 
$102  billion  was drastically  different  from  what  had been envisioned. 
In  both 1969  and 1973,  when  price  inflation  had  been  substantially  under- 
estimated  by the profession,  real GNP was forecast  quite accurately  and 
the  projection  of nominal  GNP was  far too low. In 1969,  prices  and  wages 
were  underestimated  by about  equal  amounts  and  thus  the error  in the in- 
flation  forecast  per se made  no big difference  in the estimates  of real dis- 
posable  income. In 1973, an unexpected  squeeze on real wage income 
emerged,  but the bonus  went  to farmers,  thus maintaining  real  disposable 
income.  Moreover,  with  an unexpected  $10  billion  rise  in net exports,  for- 
eigners  helped  to buoy up real GNP (as well as to intensify  inflation)  in 
1973.  For 1974,  however,  the  price  predictions  were  much  further  below  the 
mark  than  the wage  forecasts,  and  the emerging  squeeze  on real  disposable 
income  was  not anticipated.'0 
AFTER  THE  END  OF  THE  EMBARGO 
By spring,  the forecasters  had to digest disappointing  news on both 
prices  and  output  for the first  quarter.  On the other  hand,  as of March  18, 
the  lifting  of the  embargo  became  a fact and  not merely  a working  assump- 
tion. Moreover,  after  a weak  interval  in January  and February,  industrial 
production  and private employment  leveled off. While the forecasters 
scaled  down  projected  levels of real activity  throughout  1974  and in May 
the  median  forecast  called  for a tiny  decline  of real  GNP from  1973  to 1974, 
a cumulative  decline  in economic  activity  seemed  to most a less serious 
threat  than  it had at the turn  of the year.  The predicted  annual  increase  in 
the deflator  was marked  up into the 8 to 9 percent  range,  but inflation  as 
well  as output  was  expected  to look better  in the  second  half.  The  script  was 
much  the  same  as at the  beginning  of the  year:  continued  gains  in plant  and 
equipment  spending,  a recovery  in housing,  a rebound  in consumer  dura- 
bles (which  played  a larger  role than it had in the turn-of-the-year  fore- 
casts),  and less inflation  in commodities  (including  oil). 
10. Alternatively,  it can be argued that, with monetary  conditions so tight during 
1974,  the money stock exerted  more influence  on nominal GNP than it had in 1973 or 
even  in 1969;  thus inflation  led to less upward  adjustment  of the velocity of money and 
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SUMMER 
In July,  the  forecasters  got a new  view  of the  inventory  situation  from  the 
Department  of Commerce.  That  revision  raised  a few doubts-but only a 
few-about the outlook  for continuing  strength  in inventory  investment. 
Although  short-term  interest  rates were now soaring  to unprecedented 
levels,  the median  expectation  on housing  starts  in the ASA-NBER  survey 
of forecasters  in August  was  a plateau  of 1.5  million  units  during  the second 
half.  At that  point,  most gave up on a second-half  rebound  of real GNP, 
projecting  instead  an  essentially  flat  pattern.  Still,  they  were  prepared  to bet 
2 to 1 against  a decline  in real  GNP in the fourth  quarter  and  nearly  3 to 1 
against  such a decline  for the first  quarter  of 1975.  Again, they expected 
imminent  improvement  in inflation  (in part,  counting  on good crops and 
hence  falling  farm  prices)  and  an emerging  recovery  in the market  for con- 
sumer  durables  (perhaps  extrapolating  the higher  rate of car sales in the 
summer). 
In light  of subsequent  developments  in the economy  and  in fiscal  policy, 
the administration's  restrictive  fiscal  program  of October  8 must be rated 
as the  most  misconceived  stabilization  package  of the past  generation.  But, 
at least  by some  tastes  on the output-inflation  tradeoff,  it was  not unreason- 
able  against  the background  of the typical  forecast  then prevailing. 
The  Lessons  of 1974 
The  serious  errors  in appraising  the 1974  outlook  cannot  be tied to any 
particularly  defective  forecasting  theory  or technique.  Indeed,  the striking 
fact  is the basic  agreement  of most of the quantitative  forecasters,  whether 
Keynesians  or monetarists,  builders  of large  econometric  models,  devotees 
of leading  indicators,  or gazers  into crystal  balls. The tendency  toward 
agreement  may reflect  the incentive  system  operating  on forecasters:  the 
costs in income  and status  of being  wrong  when  alone  must  be far higher 
than  the costs of being  wrong  in good company. 
It is as  easy  to be wise  in retrospect  as it is difficult  to be right  in prospect. 
Yet a number  of clues that became  evident  along the way pointed  to a 
different  assessment  of the outlook  and  indeed  were  so interpreted  by a few 
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First,  by January  or February,  some  economists  appraised  the impact  of 
the oil crisis  fairly  accurately  and adjusted  their projections  of real con- 
sumption  downward  to reflect  the dent of the "oil tax" on real  disposable 
income.  Unfortunately,  in the minds of many forecasters,  the embargo 
apparently  "excused"  the setbacks  in the early  months  of 1974  and thus 
masked  the basic  weakness  of the economy.  In addition,  only a few fore- 
casters  expressed  concern  that unanticipated  inflation  might depress  con- 
sumer  demand. 
Second,  at least by midyear,  there were good reasons  to expect some 
weakening  of employment  demand  in relation  to output.  The  minority  who 
foresaw  layoffs  and rising  unemployment  expressed  doubts  about the be- 
lief-maintained  so wrongly  by so many  for so long-that  the consumer 
would  come  back  to market. 
Third,  by spring,  a few economists  were  raising  questions  about  the im- 
pact  on inflation  of the  end of wage  and  price  controls  on April  30. And  the 
less optimistic  forecasts  of inflation  were  accompanied  by greater  concern 
about  tight  money  and adverse  consumer  attitudes. 
Fourth,  by late spring,  when  interest  rates  were  soaring  and funds  once 
again  began  to flow  out of thrift  institutions,  an imminent  decline  in home- 
building  should  have been foreseen.  At least, the widespread  belief in a 
"floor"  on starts  of 1.5 million  units  should  have been subjected  to closer 
scrutiny. 
Fifth,  a few-but very  few-monetarists  viewed  the declining  real  money 
stock  in the first  half of 1974  as a danger  to real activity.  If M1  had been 
growing  at a zero rate with  inflation  at 4 percent,  monetarists  would  gen- 
erally  have  been  very  bearish  about  real  GNP. It is not clear  why  6 percent 
M1  growth  and  10  percent  inflation  did  not make  them  equivalently  bearish. 
Sixth,  the growing  excess of inventories  should  have been diagnosed  as 
final  sales  remained  (and  were  expected  to remain)  far  below  their  previous 
peak.  The  forecasters  were  betting  against  a regularity  of postwar  history  in 
expecting  no inventory  liquidation.  Particularly  after the July statistical 
revisions,  major markdowns  of projected  inventory  investment  were in 
order.  Although  such markdowns  would have worsened  the accuracy  of 
inventory  forecasts  for the  second  half  (when  stocks  piled  up involuntarily), 
they  would  have dramatically  improved  the forecasts  of real  GNP. 
Even  the  possibility  of a traditional,  typical  inventory  (and  employment) 
cycle  was widely  dismissed  until it roared  into reality  at the end of 1974. 
Many  forecasters  seemed  to regard  the  business  cycle  as obsolete.  For  four- Arthur  M. Okun  221 
teen years,  the economy  had escaped  liquidation  of inventories  and sig- 
nificant  reduction  of work forces. The samples  of data incorporated  in 
equations  and memories  alike were heavily weighted  with observations 
from  a period  of unusual  stability  in real  economic  activity.  In this  connec- 
tion,  what  many  of the  forecasters  missed  was  not something  new  but some- 
thing  old: multiplier-accelerator  interactions  and other  cumulative  cyclical 
processes.  In days  of yore,  these  were  deeply  imprinted  in the profession's 
thinking-from the experience  of the fifties; the time-series  analysis  of 
Arthur  Burns,  Wesley  Mitchell,  and others  at the National  Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic Research;  the inventory-cycle  models of Lloyd Metzler;  and the 
general  multiplier-accelerator  analysis  of Paul  Samuelson.  Those  old tracts 
could  have  helped  to keep the forecasters  on the right  track. 
The discussion of  this report is combined with that of  the Perry re- 
port which follows. 